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ABSTRACT Database forensics is a domain that uses database content and metadata to reveal malicious
activities on database systems in an Internet of Things environment. Although the concept of database
forensics has been around for a while, the investigation of cybercrime activities and cyber breaches in an
Internet of Things environment would benefit from the development of a common investigative standard that
unifies the knowledge in the domain. Therefore, this paper proposes common database forensic investigation
processes using a design science research approach. The proposed process comprises four phases, namely:
1) identification; 2) artefact collection; 3) artefact analysis; and 4) the documentation and presentation
process. It allows the reconciliation of the concepts and terminologies of all common database forensic
investigation processes; hence, it facilitates the sharing of knowledge on database forensic investigation
among domain newcomers, users, and practitioners.
INDEX TERMS Forensics, database forensics, Internet of Things forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of apps on mobile devices, software used
on Internet of Things (IoT) devices, along with the need
to improve functionality in numerous business applications,
continue to motivate interest in the area of database forensics.
Coupling this information with increasing interest in resid-
ual data in legal environments [1], [2], necessitates research
in this relatively understudied area. Database forensics is a
branch of digital forensics that uses database content, meta-
data, log files, data files, and memory data to create timelines,
establish relationships and recover relevant data [3].
The numerous pieces of input that potentially impact a dig-
ital forensic investigation involving a Database Management
System (DBMS) is inherently more complex than that of a
traditional file system [4], particularly in an IoT environment
that is likely to comprise a wide range of heterogeneous
devices. For example, in an IoT deployment in battlefields
(also referred to as Internet of Battlefield Things or Internet
of Military Things), we would need to collect evidential data
from a wide range of sensors installed on military vehicles,
cameras (e.g. IP-based CCTV feeds), road side units,
etc. These data are also likely to be in different formats
(e.g. proprietary formats) and of different sizes. While files
are often abstracted as streams of bytes, a database is a col-
lection of data where data elements are related to one another.
Hence, the process or procedures that are used in a digital
investigation directly impact the results of the examination.
Selecting investigative processes that do not fit, potentially,
leads to incomplete and/or loss of evidence [5]. This incom-
plete or missing data may lead to indecisive consequences
and give invalid conclusions. In other words, evidence that is
not acquired in a forensically sound manner may risk being
inadmissible in a court of law [6].
Thus, several database forensic investigation models have
been proposed in the literature. The proposed models range
in focus from specific scenarios to generic applications
and, in doing so, provide a variety of details as a result.
The diversity in scenarios and resulting details perceivably
make it challenging, or even complicated, particularly for
newer forensic investigators, to adopt accurate or proper
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investigation models. Due to the lack of a generic/common
database forensic investigation process model [7], [8], this
study provides a structure, referred to as the Common
Database Forensic Investigation Process (CDBFIP), which
unifies, facilitates, and shares knowledge of database forensic
investigation processes among database users and practition-
ers. Unifying these processes in a single abstract diagram
increases the knowledge available to users, newcomers, and
practitioners. Additionally, it reduces the complexity and
ambiguity of the investigation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
works related to this research. Section III describes the actual
development process of our CDBFIP based on the Design
Science Research (DSR) methodology. While it would be
ideal to evaluate CDBFIP using real-world IoT cases, it is
challenging to obtain access to such cases partly due to
the sensitive nature of forensic investigations. Therefore, in
Section IV, we use a set of nine database forensic models to
validate CDBFIP. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V
with recommendations for possible future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The database forensics domain uses database content
and metadata to identify, collect, preserve, reconstruct,
analyse and document evidence of crime. Owing to
the complexity and multidimensional nature of DBMS,
database forensics has received little attention from
researchers [3]–[5], [7], [9], [10]. Existing works in database
forensics can be viewed from three perspectives, namely:
technology (tools, algorithms, and methods, etc), investi-
gation process (e.g. identification, collection, analysis, and
presentation) and the database forensic dimension (destroyed
dimension, compromised dimension, changed dimension,
etc) [11].
A number of studies have been conducted on Oracle
databases; these works encompass specific Oracle investi-
gation tasks, activities, processes, techniques, concepts and
terminologies. For instance, a forensic investigation model
was developed by Wong and Edwards [12] that consists of
generic steps to discover information about an operation
performed on the database [9]. A Log Miner tool was
developed by Wright [13] that allows a Data Base Admin-
istrator (DBA) or forensic analyst to reconstruct actions
taken on a database [11]. Seven practical investigation
forensic models were developed by Litchfield [14]. The
author addressed information available from redo logs,
dropped objects, authentication, flashback, and a recycle bin.
Wright and Burleson [15] published a forensic textbook
on Oracle RDBMS; however, the book was written as
a guide and intended for database administrators [9].
A block diagram to collect evidence was developed by
Tripathi and Meshram [16] that is based on a series of prac-
tical methods developed to analyse database tampering in an
Oracle database [14].
In addition, a number of practical studies have been carried
out on Microsoft SQL Database Server (MSSQL Database
Server). These studies covered database investigation tasks,
activities, processes, techniques, concepts and terminolo-
gies. A methodology for an SQL Server Forensic Analysis
was proposed by Fowler [10]; the proposed methodology
involves four processes, namely, investigation preparation,
incident verification, artefact collection, and artefact analysis,
dealing specifically with an SQL server database [4], [11].
A Detection and investigation model was developed by
Son et al. [17] to detect the database server and collect
data. Fowler et al. [18] also proposed an approach to gather
and analyze data in practical and real-world scenarios. Their
approach covers technical concepts that investigators use to
investigate compromised databases. An approach for detect-
ing the tampering of forensic evidence in an SQL server
was proposed by Basu [19]; the proposed technique shows
how tampering can be detected and how to localize
the affected data but does not provide tamper-prevention
measures [20], [21]. A methodology to distinguish suspi-
cious transactions from legitimate transactions among the
SQL Server artefacts, in order to eliminate irrelevant data,
was proposed by Khanuja and Adane [22]. This methodology
specifically considered the investigation processes, technol-
ogy, and database dimension in its solution.
Relatively few studies have been conducted that investi-
gate a MySQL database in reference to database forensics.
A study by Khanuja and Adane [3] did develop a framework
for MySQL database forensic analysis. The proposed frame-
work focuses on discovering malicious tampering in My
SQL database. The authors further highlighted the database
server artefacts that were employed for the investigation.
It is worth noting that a model for detecting database incon-
sistencies was proposed by Fruhwirt et al. [23]; nevertheless,
there was no knowledge discovered for multiple log files or
cache for further analysis [24]. To address the limitations of
the model proposed by Frühwirt et al. [24], another model
was proposed by Frühwirt et al. [25] to reconstruct the basic
SQL statements from InnoDB’s redo logs. However, this
model focuses on the Data Manipulation Language (DML)
statements and ignores the Data Definition Language (DDL)
statements. To address situations where the user is unavail-
able or where the user is under investigation, Lawrence [26]
proposed a technical investigation method to gain access to
users’ MySQL database without user consent. According to
Adedayo [27], several works have been conducted in digital
forensics. However, they largely focus on cloud forensics and
smartphone forensics [28]–[45]. They do not directlymention
ddatabase forensics. While certain aspects of database foren-
sics have been investigated over the years [7], [11], [46], [47],
there has been minimal research into the development of a
standard/common approach for unifying investigation tasks
and activities among investigators.
This paper aims to unify the investigation process of the
database forensics in one platform called CDBFIP. It consid-
ers as abstract base for our previous paper [48] that proposed
a metamodel (modelling language) for database forensics.
Also, we developed a metamodel (modelling language for
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mobile forensics to categorise and structure mobile forensics
domain [49]. Therefore, this paper addresses the variety of the
investigation process for whole database forensics domain.
III. METHODOLOGY
This study embraces a Design Science Research (DSR)
methodology to design the proposed process artefact, here-
after referred to as the Common Database Forensic Inves-
tigation Processes (CDBFIP) [50], [51]. DSR is a research
methodology that is used to create new and persistent arte-
facts for a special problem domain that enables analytics to
be examined [52]. This particular implementation of DSR
concentrates on Information Technology (IT) artefacts that
significantly impact the application domain. According to
March and Smith [52], the creation of DSR can be explained
in terms of four kinds of artefacts which include the fol-
lowing: constructs that organize the language to identify
problems and solutions, models that use this language to
describe problems and solutions, methods that define pro-
cesses that offer assistance on how to answer problems and
the final artefact instantiations which are defined as combi-
nations of constructs, models, and methods. The DSR life-
cycle embraces repetitious assessment of produced artefacts.
The execution of the DSR life-cycle necessitates that the
building and assessment of the artefact are completed before
the artefact is offered to users. The design science process
includes six steps, which are illustrated in Fig. 1 [47], [53].
FIGURE 1. Database Forensic models covering different perspectives.
A. IDENTIFY AND SELECT DATABASE FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION MODELS
Several database forensic models were discussed and ana-
lyzed in the literature review. Model selection for this
research was based on coverage factors that were identified in
previous research [47], [54]. Awide coverage of perspectives,
concepts, and terminologies that are broadly applicable is
required to fulfill the aim of proposing a common investi-
gation process for database forensics. Using coverage metric
quickly provides an indication of sourcedmodel applicability.
The model is said to have a high coverage value, if the model
can cover all database forensic perspectives (i.e., a general
model). The model has a reduced amount of coverage value,
FIGURE 2. Method for proposing a common investigation process for
database forensics, adapted from existing research [47], [53].
if the model only describes a specific database forensic per-
spective, such as the technology perspective (i.e., a specific
model). Therefore, models that cover at least two database
forensic dimensions, two databases forensic investigation
processes, and at least one database forensic investigation
technology (tool, method, or algorithm) were identified and
selected for developing CDBFIP. However, models that cov-
ered only specific database forensics perspectives (i.e., one or
two perspectives) were identified and selected for validation
purposes. For example, a System and Method for Investi-
gating a Data Operation Performed on a Database Model,
which is proposed by Wong and Edwards [12], covered three
perspectives of the database forensics domain. In addition, the
SQL Server Forensic Analysis Methodology approach that is
proposed by Fowler [10] covered the three database foren-
sics perspectives. Table 1 displays thirty-eight (38) database
forensic models that were identified and selected from
forty (40) existing database forensic models. Fig 2 displays
the models that cover both generic and specific database
forensic perspectives. Group ‘‘A’’ refers to models that cover
the all database forensic perspectives. Group ‘‘B’’ refers to
models that cover only two database forensic perspectives.
Group ‘‘C’’ refers to models that cover a single database
forensic perspective. Step 3.2 concentrates on recognizing
and extracting investigation processes from the eighteen (18)
selected database forensics models.
A database forensic investigation process was derived from
eighteen (18) selected models. During the course of the
extraction, certain criteria [48], [55] were adhered to in order
to identify a relevant and proper investigation process. The
criteria used to identify the database forensic investigation
processes are as follows:
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TABLE 1. Database forensic investigation models.
C1: Titles, abstracts, related works and conclusions
were excluded; the investigation process was either
extracted from the diagram or from the main textual
model.
C2: The investigation process must have a definition or
activity; the investigation process must have a definition or
activity to recognize the purpose, meaning, and functioning
of the process.
C3: Irrelevant investigation processes not related to con-
ducting database forensics were excluded.
C4: Include explicit and implicit investigation processes
from models.
The above criteria were utilized in an attempt to avoid
any missing or random process selections. For example,
the investigation process model to reveal malicious database
activities for an Oracle database was proposed by Wong and
Edwards [12]. Their solution consists of four investigation
processes, namely: Suspending database operation, collect-
ing data, reconstructing a database, and restoring database
integrity. Another model was developed by Wright [13] to
discover and analyze intruder activities in an MSSQL server
database.Wright [13] provided a solution that consists of four
investigation processes, namely: Verification, Evidence Col-
lection, Timeline Creation, and Media Analysis. In addition,
two investigation processes were extracted from [56], which
were Identification and Collection, to identify and collect
volatile and non-volatile data.
Additionally, four investigation processes have been
extracted from Fowler’s [10] model to identify, verify, collect
and analyze MSSQL server database incidents: Investiga-
tion preparation, Incident verification, Artefact collection,
and Artefact analysis. In addition, two investigation pro-
cesses were extracted from a model to detect and extract
malicious relations among tables that were proposed by
Lee and Choi [57]: Preparation of database environment
and data extraction. The other three investigation processes,
Data acquisition, Financial data analysis, Final report and
court submission, were proposed by Choi et al. [58] to detect
fraud statements. Furthermore, Oliver [9] proposed three
investigation processes to extract, search and restoremetadata
that are used for investigative purposes:Metadata extraction,
Restoration, and Searchability.
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TABLE 2. Extracted database forensic investigation process from 18 models.
In addition, a process investigation model was introduced
by Son et al. [17] for enterprise environments. The investi-
gation process involves three steps: server process detection
subsequent to an incident report, followed by data collection
and an investigation on the data collected.
In addition, a tamper detection model was proposed by
Tripathi andMeshram [16] to introduce the concept of tamper
detection for digital evidence stored in a database. Thus,
the two investigation processes highlighted in [16] are Setup
evidence collection server and file collection.
A framework proposed by Khanuja and Adane [3]
deals with the forensic analysis of a MySQL server
database. It consists of four main investigation processes:
Identification, Artefact collection, Artefact analysis and
Final forensic report. Another framework was offered
by Susaimanickam [59] to analyze database incidents.
It consists of four investigation processes: Examination
preparation, Collection phase, Reconstruction phase, and
Documentation and presentation. In addition, six investiga-
tive processes were advocated by Fasan and Oliver [60] to
investigate database incidents, namely: Determine database
dimension, Determination of acquisition method, Collection
of volatile artefacts, Collection of non-volatile artefacts,
Preservation and authentication of collected data, and Anal-
ysis of collected data. Another forensic analysis model was
proposed by Khanuja and Adane [22] for combining mul-
tiple pieces of evidences. Their solution offers two general
processes for this purpose: Artefact collection and Forensic
analysis. Additionally, a model was proposed by Beyers [7]
to investigate a compromised database management sys-
tem. Generally, it consists of two main investigation pro-
cesses: the Identification process and the Collection process.
In addition, another process model was proposed by
Khanuja and Suratkar [61] to collect, preserve and
analyze database metadata against database attacks.
Three main investigation processes were proposed by
Khanuja and Suratkar [61]: Collection of metadata, Preser-
vation of metadata, and Analysis of database attacks.
The model proposed by Frühwirt et al. [62] is designed
to reconstruct database events to detect intruder activities,
via the following: a Collection process to gather evidence
by replicating sources and a Reconstructing evidence process
that is necessary to rebuild user activities and detect malicious
activities. Similarly, an investigation process model was pro-
posed by Adedayo and Oliver [5] to reconstruct and analyse
database activity using log files via the Reconstruction pro-
cess andAnalysis process. Finally,Wagner et al., [4] proposed
a database forensic analysis model to reconstruct database
activities through internal structure carving, via Reconstruct-
ing volatile artefacts, and recovering database schema.
Therefore, as an output of this section, fifty-four (54)
investigation processes were identified and extracted from
these eighteen (18) database forensic models. The proposed
investigation processes are interlinked activities and tasks
to achieve the goal of the Database Forensic activity. Thus,
the next step merged and extracted investigation processes
that were grouped based on their activities and meaning.
Table 2 presents the extracted database forensic investigation
process from the eighteen (18) models.
B. MERGING AND GROUPING OF THE EXTRACTED
DATABASE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION PROCESSES
The fifty-four (54) extracted database forensic investigation
processes are merged and grouped together based on simi-
lar activities and concepts [63], [64]. All investigation pro-
cesses having similar activities and concepts are organised,
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TABLE 3. The first group of organized, merged and grouped investigation processes.
merged and grouped into separate collections. The first
grouping scrutinized processes that broadly dealt with inves-
tigation preparation, incident identification, and verifica-
tion. The initial merging and grouping of the extracted
database forensic investigation processes is demonstrated as
follows.
The Suspension of Database Operation in the model of
Wong and Edwards [12] isolates the database server from
the users in order to capture database activities, while the
Verification process in the model of Fowler et al. [18] ver-
ifies and checks incidents, isolates the database server, and
confirms the incident. In addition, the Identification pro-
cess in [56] deals with disconnecting database servers from
the network in order to capture volatile data. Likewise, the
purpose of the Investigation preparation and Incident veri-
fication in [10] is to identify and verify database incidents
through a preliminary investigation, prepare forensic work-
stations and forensic toolkits to respond to incidents and then
disconnect the database server. Furthermore, the Preparation
of theDatabase Environment proposed in Lee et al’s [57] used
to prepare the investigation environment and to obtain neces-
sary permission to access the database and execute required
commands. Additionally, theData Acquisition process neces-
sitates securing the location of evidence and extracting evi-
dence that relates to a crime or an incident [58]. Another
process of interest is Server Detection which is used to
identify and detect the victim database server [17]. Further-
more, the Setup Evidence Collection Server process described
in [16] is used to prepare the investigation environment to
store incidents, while the Identification process described
in [3] identifies relevant MySQL database files (text files, log
files, binary files) and utilities.
Similarly, Susaimanickam [59] proposed a model for the
Examination Preparation process, which is used to detect
database incidents by cutting off the network, configuring the
investigation environment, identifying policies, preparing the
proper tools and also informing decision making.
In addition, Fasan and Oliver [60] proposed a model for
Determining Database Dimension and Acquisition Method,
which is used for identifying which dimension of the database
has been attacked or hacked. Once this has been achieved,
the proper acquisition methods for that dimension are then
identified. An identification process model is proposed by
Beyers [7] that is aimed at the database forensic layers, meth-
ods and environment. Therefore, fourteen (14) investigation
processes have been organized, merged and grouped based on
their activities and congruent concepts. Table 3 presents the
first group of organized, merged and grouped investigation
processes.
The second grouping inspected processes from the data
collection perspective. Wong and Edwards [12] proposed a
model for the data collection process aimed at assembling
data metadata and intruder activity. Similar processes are
introduced by Fowler et al. [18] that include Evidence Collec-
tion to collect evidence from the victim database server and
an Evidence Collection process proposed by Litchfield [56]
to collect volatile data from compromised database
servers. Fowler [10] proposed an Artefact Collection model
(Fowler, 2008) that is used to collect volatile and non-
volatile MSSQL Server database artefacts such as log
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TABLE 4. The second group of organized merged and grouped investigation processes.
files, data files, a data cache, transaction logs, and log
files.
Additionally, a data Extraction process is proposed by
Lee et al. [57] to extract data on relationships that connect
columns in database tables. In addition, the Data Acquisition
process, proposed by Choi et al. [58], has similar activi-
ties designed to extract fraud data from a database server.
Additionally, the Metadata Extraction process offered by
Oliver [9] to extract the metadata of the database dimension
is used to determine who was authorized to perform a certain
action. In addition, the Data Collection process presented by
Son et al. [17] is subdivided into two stages that consist of
a stage dedicated to selectively files and another stage that
focuses on collecting entire files. In addition, a file collec-
tion model was introduced by Tripathi and Meshram [16] to
collect Oracle files from specific locations and move them
to the evidence collection server for further investigation.
Furthermore, the Artefact Collection process was proposed
by Khanuja and Adane [3] to collect and extract database files
and metadata from compromised MySQL Server databases.
Similarly, Susaimanickam [59] proposed aCollection process
as a sub-process of physical and digital examination to collect
physical and digital data. Moreover, the Collection of Volatile
Artefacts andNon-Volatile Artefacts processes were proposed
by Fasan andOliver [60] to collect database files, log files, log
transactions and also volatile artefacts such as data caches,
redo log, and undo log.
Similar to the Artefact Collection process presented by
Fowler [10], an Artefact Collection process was proposed by
Khanuja and Adane [22]. The Collection process introduced
by Beyers [7] allows one to collect and extract suspected
database management system data and move it to a secure
area for further forensic investigation, and theMetadata Col-
lection process proposed byKhanuja and Suratkar [61] allows
one to collect detailed multiple logs of SQL, MySQL and
operating systems.
Implicitly, the preservation process is mentioned
by Wong and Edwards [12] under the Collecting Data pro-
cess to protect the integrity of data by hashing collected
data. It is also mentioned in Fowler’s [10] model under
the Artefact Collection process to prevent any modification
of collected data. In addition, Choi et al. [58] mentioned
implicitly as ‘‘Secure data sources’’ under the Data Acqui-
sition process. In [9], it was mentioned as an integrity mea-
sure to provide an exact copy of the original data. In the
model proposed by Susaimanickam [59], it was described
as the main preservation process in the Physical & Digital
Examination process. Explicitly, it was mentioned in [60]
along with the Collecting Metadata process as the preser-
vation of metadata. Thus, the preservation process was
grouped with the collection process. Therefore, sixteen (16)
investigation processes have been organized, merged and
grouped based on their activities and meaning. Table 4
presents the second grouping of organized, merged and
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TABLE 5. The third group of organized, merged and grouped investigation processes.
grouped investigation processes having similar activities and
concepts.
The third grouping broadly focused on database recon-
struction, artefact analysis and overall forensic analysis. For
example, an Analysis process has been mentioned in sev-
eral models. In the model of Wong and Edwards [12], it
was used to Reconstruct a Database and Restore Database
Integrity after collecting data to rebuild intruder activities
along with revealing malicious actions and restoring database
consistency. In addition, Fowler [18] mentioned it as dif-
ferent names in two models. For example, in the model
of Folwer et al. [18], it was mentioned as part of the
Timeline Creation and Media Analysis processes, while
Fowler [10] described it as part of the Artefact Analysis
process to reconstruct timeline events and analyse malicious
activity. In addition, Choi et al’s. [58] model referred to
the analysis process as Financial Data Analysis and used it
to reveal fraudulent transactions. Other models referred to
the analysis process as Restoration and Searchability [9],
where Son et al’s., [17] model referred to it as the
Investigation on Data Collected process. Furthermore,
Khanuja and Adane’s [3] model mentioned it explicitly
as Artefact Analysis. It is mentioned implicitly as part of
the Reconstruction phase along with the physical and dig-
ital examination process in [59]. Other models referred to
the Analysis process as Forensic Analysis [22], Analysing
Database Attacks [61],Reconstructing Evidence [62],Recon-
struction [5], and Reconstructing Volatile Artefacts [4].
Some models highlighted certain investigation processes
explicitly or implicitly. For example, the Reconstruction pro-
cess was mentioned explicitly in several models [4], [5], [12],
[62], while it was mentioned implicitly under the Artefact
analysis process in [10] and also mentioned implicitly in
Choi et al.’s [58] model under the Financial Data Analysis
process. In addition, it is mentioned as the Restoration pro-
cess in [9], which used it to refer to the recreation of data that
have been (partially) destroyed or only partially recovered
by a forensic capture process. Moreover, it is mentioned
implicitly under the Physical & digital examination process
in [59]. Therefore, it will be merged and grouped along with
the Analysis process because it is part of the process that is
used to rebuild timeline events during the analysis process.
Therefore, seventeen (17) investigation processes have been
organized, merged and grouped based on their activities and
concepts. Table 5 presents the third grouping of organized,
merged and grouped investigation processes with similar con-
cepts and activities.
An additional refinement of the identified processes exam-
ined the similarities from the broad perspective of docu-
mentation which would include presentation and reporting.
TheDocumentation and Presentation process was mentioned
by Susaimanickam [59] to document and present whole
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TABLE 6. The fourth group of organized merged and grouped investigation processes.
TABLE 7. Mapping process of forensic investigation group 1
investigation stages and submit the results to the court. In
addition, Choi et al. [58] offered it as a final report and court
submission, whereas Khanuja and Adane [3] mentioned it as
a final forensic report. Table 6 displays the fourth group of
organized and merged investigation processes.
In the summary of this section, fifty-four (54) extracted
database forensic investigation processes have been orga-
nized, merged, and grouped based on their activities and
concepts. Four forensic investigation groups have been high-
lighted. Every group has similar processes in meaning and
activities, regardless of actual naming. Every group has
a common investigation process amongst other processes.
Therefore, the common investigation process for every group
will be proposed in the next section.
C. PROPOSED COMMON INVESTIGATION PROCESS FOR
DATABASE FORENSIC EXAMINATION
Four forensic investigation groups have been highlighted in
Section 3.3 based on similarities in concept and activities.
This section aims to propose a common investigation process
for every group. The mapping process has been adopted to
propose common investigation processes. The investigative
process, which has a higher frequency in the group, will be
a candidate and be referred to as a common investigation
process. From these phases, four common database foren-
sic investigation processes were derived: Identification pro-
cess, Artefact Collection & Preservation, Artefact Analysis,
and Documentation and presentation process. Since some of
these processes overlap, it was necessary to take into account
the activities performed in each of the investigative processes
and to not rely solely on naming conventions [63], [64].
The mapping process is adopted to select the more frequent
investigation process for every forensic investigation group.
Identification process was identified as an investigation pro-
cess by fifteen (15) investigation processes in Group 1.
It appears three times in three models [56], [3], [7].
Table 7 shows the mapping process of forensic investigation
in Group 1.
In addition, Artefact Collection was identified as an inves-
tigative process by sixteen (16) investigation processes in
Group 2. It appears three times in three models [10], [22], [3].
Table 8 shows the mapping process of forensic investigation
in Group 2.
The Artefact analysis process was identified as a common
investigation process among seventeen (17) investigation pro-
cesses in forensic investigation Group 2. It appears two times
in two different models [10], [3]. Table 9 shows the mapping
process of forensic investigation in Group 3.
In addition, the Documentation and Presentation process
was identified as a common investigation process from foren-
sic investigation Group 4. This process has rarely been men-
tioned by researchers. Therefore, the author suggests using
this process due to its generality. Fig 3 displays the pro-
posed common investigation process for a database forensic
investigation.
In summary, four (4) common investigation processes have
been proposed based on their frequency or generality. Three
common investigation processes have been proposed based
on their frequency (Identification, Artefact Collection, and
Artefact Analysis). However, the Documentation and Pre-
sentation process has been proposed based on its generality.
It is more general than other investigation processes in
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TABLE 8. Mapping process of forensic investigation group 2.
TABLE 9. Mapping process of forensic investigation group 3.
the forensic investigation. The next section will com-
bine the various definitions of database forensic inves-
tigation processes and reconcile them to the abstract
definition.
D. RECONCILIATION OF INVESTIGATION PROCESS
DEFINITIONS
Explicit definitions are important in science. Precise defini-
tions help to give a clear meaning of concepts. Differences
between definitions are reconciled in this phase.
In choosing or synthesizing, the common investigation pro-
cess definitions to be used are shortlisted in this phase. If there
is a conflict in the definition between two or more sources,
then the definitions are reconciled based on common defini-
tions and environment applicability. Some models explicitly
omit defining their concept; in such cases, they do not provide
any input to the reconciliation process. Therefore, this section
aims to harmonize and reconcile the investigation process
shortlisted definition. The same reconciliation approach pro-
cess has been implemented in previous research [47], [53].
Similar definitions are reconciled and harmonized into one
abstract definition.
For example, the proposed Identification process defined
by Litchfield [56] ‘‘deals with disconnecting the database
server from the network to capture volatile data as well as pre-
pare forensic environment and forensic techniques to moved
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FIGURE 3. Proposed common database forensic investigation
processes (CDBFIP).
captured data in’’, whereas [3] defined it as ‘‘Identification
process used to identify MySQL database files (text files,
log files, binary files) and also identify MySQL utilities’’.
On the other hand, Beyers [7] defined it as ‘‘Identification
process for preparing database forensic layers and forensic
methods, as well as preparing forensic environment (found
environment, clean environment)’’. Therefore, the definition
of Litchfield’s [56] is specific to isolating the database server
along with preparing the forensic environment and forensic
techniques, whereas the definition by Khanuja and Adane [3]
is too specific to deal with preparing MySQL database files
and utilities. However, the definition of Beyers [7] is similar
to [56]. Thus, Byers’s definition and Litchfield’s definition
will be reconciled and harmonized in one abstract definition:
‘‘Identification process is the first Database Forensic inves-
tigation process that is used to prepare a clean database foren-
sic investigation environment and trust forensic techniques,
as well as allow the investigation team to isolate the database
server enough from the network to prevent users from tam-
pering and capturing volatile and non-volatile data’’.
In addition, ‘‘Artefact Collection’’ was defined by three
different researchers. Fowler [10] defined it as ‘‘collec-
tion of volatile and non-volatile MSSQL Server database
artefacts such as log files, data files, data cache, transac-
tion logs, and log files’’. Whereas, Khanuja and Adane [3]
defined it as ‘‘collection and extraction of database files
and metadata from a compromised database’’. In addition,
Khanuja and Adane [22] defined it as a ‘‘collection of volatile
and nonvolatile MSSQL Server database artefacts such as log
files, data files, a data cache, transaction logs, and log files’’.
From an analysis viewpoint, [10] definition is too specific to
MSSQL server database, whereas [22] defined the Artefact
Collection process from two perspectives. The first defini-
tion focused on non-volatile artefacts, whereas the second
definition was borrowed from Fowler [10]. Consequently, a
harmonized and reconciled version of this definition is as
follows: ‘‘Artefact Collection process is the second Database
Forensic investigation process that is used to collect and
preserve volatile and non-volatile artefacts from the suspect
database using trust forensic techniques’’.
Additionally, the Artefact Analysis process has two defini-
tions. Fowler [10] defined it as ‘‘analysing authentication and
authorization events, as well as configuring and versioning
artefacts. Furthermore, analysing activity reconstruction and
data recovery artefacts, which make up the largest grouping
of artefacts’’, whereas Khanujha and Adane [3] defined it as
‘‘analysing all data that are acquired through the incident
verification and collection phases’’. Clearly, [10] definition
is brother than [3]. Thus, we harmonize and reconcile these
definitions as ‘‘Artefact Analysis process is the third Database
Forensic investigation process that is used to analyze acquired
data, activity reconstruction and data recovery using spe-
cial forensic techniques to reveal who is tampering, when
and where the tampering happened and how the tampering
happened.’’
Finally, the Documentation and Presentation process was
defined by Susaimanickam [59] as ‘‘Documents and presents
whole investigation stages, and submit the results to the
court’’. However, the authors reconciled it as ‘‘Documen-
tation and Presentation investigation process is the fourth
Database Forensic investigation process that is used to doc-
ument and present the investigation stages and submit the
results to the court’’.
In summary, the proposed common investigation process
definitions have been reconciled and harmonized into abstract
definitions. The next section concentrates on comparing the
proposed common investigation processes against other exist-
ing database forensic models to validate and verify the com-
pleteness and generality of proposed common investigation
processes.
IV. VALIDATION OF PROPOSED COMMON
INVESTIGATION PROCESSES
The version of the proposed common investigation process
will now be validated and improved to make it complete and
coherent.
The derived processes, of the proposed common investiga-
tion process, are validated and compared to processes from
other similar existing domain models [79]–[81]. For this pur-
pose, we used a set of nine popular and widely used database
forensic models in a validation set. Every investigation pro-
cess, in each of the models, can be appropriately derived from
an investigation process. Where required, we modified the
proposed investigation process to ensure that it can represent
all models in the validation set. This validation ensures that
the database forensics domain can be represented in each
of the models in the validation set. Where applicable, pro-
posed investigation processes were modified to ensure that
every model can be represented. No processes were changed,
e.g., Identification-process, Artefact Collection-process,
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Artefact Analysis process, and Documentation & Presenta-
tion process in the proposed common investigation processes.
A. COMPARISON AGAINST EFFICIENT MODEL FOR
DETECTING DATA AND DATA SCHEMES TAMPERING FOR
THE PURPOSE OF VALID FORENSIC ANALYSIS
A detection model, proposed by Azemović and Mušić [72],
aimed at detecting database system tampering. It offered an
efficient approach to providing audit logs for transaction
processing systems that can effectively and efficiently detect
tampering. SQL coding and cryptographic techniques such as
strong cryptographic hashing were used to provide authenti-
cation codes on collected data. Thus, this model implicitly
provides collection process. the collection process is used to
extract data from log files and secure the validity of the col-
lected data. Therefore, the proposed common investigation
process ‘‘Artefact Collection’’ covered the existing investiga-
tion process in the model ‘‘Collection process’’.
B. COMPARISON AGAINST METHODS FOR EFFICIENT
DIGITAL EVIDENCE COLLECTION OF BUSINESS
PROCESSES
Three techniques were proposed by
Azemović and Mušić [73] to collect digital evidence from
database systems: Triggers, Log file backup, and Replica-
tions. Triggers are very powerful elements in a database
system that, if used properly, can be very helpful in detecting
data modifications. In addition, the log file backup concept
can be used on a regular basis for collecting and keeping dig-
ital evidence of users’ activity. Additionally, the replication
method is a set of technologies for copying and distributing
data and database objects from one environment to another;
it then synchronizes between databases to maintain consis-
tency. Therefore, this model offered a Collection process to
collect evidence using three methods against user behavior.
Thus, the proposed Artefact collection process has covered
the Collection process.
C. COMPARISON WITH ASSEMBLING METADATA
FOR DATABASE FORENSICS
A collection process model has been offered by
Beyers et al. [82] to locate the key evidence and maintain the
integrity and reliability of the evidence. This model describes
a database forensic method that transforms a DBMS into
the required state for a database forensic investigation. The
method segments a DBMS into four abstract layers that
separate the various levels of DBMS metadata and data.
Therefore, the proposed common investigation process
‘‘Artefact Collection’’ covered the existing investigation pro-
cess ‘‘Collection process’’ in this model.
D. COMPARISON AGAINST ORACLE FORENSICS PART 2:
LOCATING DROPPED OBJECTS
The model offered by Litchfield [83] allows the investiga-
tor to recover evidence directly from the data files of the
compromised server, although an attacker may drop objects.
Several Oracle views and tables assist the investigator
in locating dropped objects such as OBJ$, SOURCE$,
IDL_UB1$, IDL_CHAR$, and RECYCLEBIN$ tables.
Therefore, the proposed investigation process ‘‘Artefact anal-
ysis’’ has been covered by the Recover evidence process
that is offered in this model. In addition, the activities of
this process, such as reconstructing events and timelines, are
covered as well.
E. COMPARISON AGAINST ‘‘ON THE COMPLETENESS OF
RECONSTRUCTED DATA FOR DATABASE FORENSICS’’
A specific reconstruction process was offered by [84] to
rebuild deleted relations or deleted records from the database
to introduce evidence against database incidents. A recon-
struction algorithm is used through a reconstruction pro-
cess to allow the investigators to provide evidence against
database modifications. Thus, this process and its activi-
ties were enclosed by the proposed investigation process
‘‘Artefact Analysis’’.
F. COMPARISON AGAINST DATABASE TAMPERING AND
DETECTION OF DATA FRAUD
Analysis process was proposed by Gawali and Gupta [85] to
detect and analyze malicious activity. Therefore, the foren-
sic detection algorithm and forensic analysis algorithm have
been offered in this model to detect corruption events and
determine when and where database tampering occurred. The
outcome of this model has covered the proposed investigation
process ‘‘Artefact Analysis’’.
G. COMPARISON AGAINST ENRICHING FORENSIC
ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR TAMPERED DATA IN DATABASE
A forensic analysis process for tampered data in the database
was offered by Abhonkar and Kanthe [68] to detect and
analyze database tampering. The Tiled Bitmap Algorithm
was used to reveal when the tampering occurred and what
data were altered. The outcome of this model covered the pro-
posed investigation process ‘‘Artefact Analysis’’ with respect
to activities and tasks.
H. COMPARISON AGAINST AN APPROACH TO
EXAMINING THE METADATA AND DATA OF
A DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This process model was proposed by Beyers et al. [75] to
conduct a forensic examination on a DBMS. A Preparation
process was offered in this model. The investigator prepares
the forensic examination environment, for example, setting
up the Ubuntu operating system and PostgreSQLDBMS, and
also prepares the forensic comparison tool, which can be used
by the investigator to reveal database tampering. Therefore,
the preparation process was covered by the proposed common
investigation process Identification process.
I. COMPARISON AGAINST FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF
DATABASE TAMPERING
The forensic analysis process model of database tamper-
ing was proposed by Pavlou and Snodgrass [86] to ana-
lyze corruption events in database systems. Several forensic
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TABLE 10. A comparative summary: proposed common investigation
process and existing database forensic models.
analysis algorithms were introduced in this model and are
to be applied after detecting a database intrusion in order
to answer questions regarding when and where tamper-
ing occurred. Therefore, the forensic analysis process that
was proposed in this model, along with the activities, has
been covered by the proposed common investigation process
‘‘Artefact Analysis’’.
In summary, the proposed common investigation processes
for database forensics was validated against nine existing
database forensic models. The proposed common investi-
gation process covers the investigation processes that are
derived from the compared models. Table 10 displays the
proposed common investigation process in comparison to the
database forensic models.
V. CONCLUSION
The escalating dependency of IoT devices to retain and
manipulate data stored in databases emphasizes the need to
develop an in-depth understanding of the nuances associated
with conducting a database forensic investigation (Kebande
and Ray, 2016; Teing et al., 2017). This need will be more
pronounced as IoT becomes the norm in both civilian andmil-
itary settings, such as Internet of Battlefield/Military Things.
In this paper, we identified fifty-four (54) investigation pro-
cesses that were extracted from eighteen (18) database foren-
sic models. These processes were then grouped and refined
based on common objectives to identify mutual investigation
processes for the database forensic domain. This analysis
resulted in the Common Database Forensic Investigation
Processes (CDBFIP). Based on a thorough investigation of
identified processes and models, the CDBFIP reveals that
the database forensic investigation process has four common
processes: identification, artefact collection and preservation
process, artefact analysis process, and documentation and
presentation process. We then used nine existing database
forensic investigation models to validate the completeness of
the CDBFIP model.
Future work will include examining the concepts and rela-
tionships in each of the identified processes in the CDBFIP by
applying a software engineering approach known as a meta-
model, as well as evaluating the CDBFIP using real-world
IoT datasets. Future work will also investigate the application
of probabilistic and measurement science techniques into
specific IoT database extraction solutions. The idea is to start
to be able to quantify confidence in terms of data relevance,
origination and tool extraction performance. We will also
be seeking out opportunities to implement and evaluate the
proposed CDBFIP in a real-world IoT infrastructures, which
will allow us to validate and refine the model.
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